## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

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8 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: [COLONEL KING

SUBJECT

Guatemala

- 1. Early in July Mr. Dulles, Mr. Hedden, J, and myself visited the State Department where we had a conference at which were present Assistant Secretary of State Miller, his Deputy, Mr. Mann, and Mr. Robert P. Joyce. The CIA delegation posed the following three questions: (as well as I can remember)
  - 1. Would the State Department like to see a different government in Guatemala?
  - 2. Would the State Department oppose a government established by the use of force?
  - 3. Does the State Department wish CIA to take steps to bring about a change of government?
- 2. The first question was answered positively. The second question was answered negatively. The third question was not answered clearly but by implication, positively.
- 3. Mr. Dulles asked me to make a Memorandum of Conversation in long-hand and deliver the one copy to him. I did this and waited in his office while he showed it to the Director. In a few minutes I was called into the Director's office, and it was soon clear that the Director was dissatisfied with the lack of a direct answer to the third question. He then telephoned to Mr. Bruce to make arrangements for a meeting.
- 4. I later gathered from Mr. Dulles that the Director had received a satisfactory answer from Mr. Bruce.

CPP/WH

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SECRET Eyes only

Subject: The Abortive Coup against the Guatemalan government of 5 November 1950 1. olonel Carlos CASTILLO Armas was known to I in his position as political reporting officer in the Embassy, he saw no reason for refusing to see CASTILLO Armas when he called on him two or three times at his home. CASTILLO Armas discussed the changes in government he would like to see put into effect in Guatemala and he discussed the possiblity of a revolt, but in general terms. 2. CASTILLO Armas visited [ at his home on 31 Ocotber 1951. Again he discussed a coup against the government in general terms, but never once mentioned any date having been set. On 5 November 1950, CASTILLO Armas and his companions made their abortive attempt. It was first reported that CASTILLO Armas had been killed, but later it was learned that he had been wounded and was in the prison hospital. CASTILLO at the Am. Embassy is supposed to have said that he could count on help from the -ucombesey.  $oldsymbol{1}$  the American Embassy was told that the recall of  $oldsymbol{L}$ was going to be requested. ( L I part in this story was not too pleasant). 3. Ameeting with the Minister of Defense, Colonel Rafael O'Meany, was arranged for  $m{Z}$   $m{J}$  $m{1}$  who presented himself at 2:00 p.m. on 6 November 1952, accompanied by . Major Jose Luis Cruz, Chief of the Guatemalan Army G-2 was present. In the interview the Sniefrof Station did not receive our characters and remarked: kinxAmericanxcencenionax Major CRUZ paring that once L l knew CASTILLO Armas was plotting, he should not have received him any more. L 3 said that he must understan that he knew CMXXX only in a general way that Castillo was plotting -- and that nothing specific had every been told him. In general, Z came off with a clean bill of health - even though we recalled him soon after. [ 7 believes that G-2 had not been surveilling his house, but following CASTILLO Armas, and of course learned of his visi: on 31 October. He believes that the G-2's first interest in him began when they obtained the information about CASTILLO's remarking that he could count on me in the Embassy for before. A summation by L in a cable is as follows: harge d'Affaires reporting incident to

A summation by a in a cable is as follows: harge d'Affaires reporting incident to department but believes matter closed. He agrees baiss of charges completely unfounded and congratulated me on making approach to Minister of Defense. Was concerned about possible compromise because of other intelligence activities but now reassured. Both he and I unable to explain why and Charge has severely criticized for this. I am not making making issue.

dci in telephone conversation with mr. Bruce, asked for advice reference investment in a new company and indicated that he planned an original investment of \$50,000 with a further investment of \$